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Abstract 
Does the government ideological composition play a role in fiscal policy formation? According to 
the conventional view left winged governments are more likely to increase government spending, 
while right winged governments are reducing public debt. This paper examines how ideological 
composition of government influences general government spending using data from 25 OECD 
countries for the period from 1995 through 2014. Results of fixed effect regression model suggest 
that there is no effect of partisanship neither on general government expenditure, nor on social 
spending or military spending. Results also suggest that while there is no difference in spending 
amount, left-winged governments tend to have relatively higher deficit spending policies than 
right-winged government. Also, I find a negative significant effect of right winged ideology on 
general expenditure in case of relatively high unemployment level.  On the one hand empirical 
findings support newly developed idea that partisanship effect is insignificant as partisan 
differences are minor due to the increased level of globalization and international integration in 
last few years, but on the other high debt polices for left oriented governments underline the effect 
of ideological difference on policy formation. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Party ideology of government is believed to have a significant effect on fiscal policy. However, 
empirical evidence on this matter is diverse. Recently, a substantial body of literature addresses 
economic and political determinants of public policy (Imbeau 2001). Many studies have 
questioned the existence of any major difference between left-right ideologies (Hofmesiter 2011), 
while others have argued about distinctive government policies based on core differences 
developed in ideological origins (Hibbs 1977). Some scholars have discussed the globalization as 
a destructive factor for partisan differences (Goodman & Pauly, 1993), while others have 
introduced certain circumstances and conditions where partisanship emerges (Shi & Svensson, 
2006).  
Theoretically it is considered that compared to right winged government, left winged governments 
implement higher general spending policies (Swank 1998). However, some empirical studies 
present contrary results (Garrett & Lange, 1991). Still, large number of studies blame left winged 
governments in increased deficit spending (Roubini 2008). Some papers have focused on partisan 
effect on general government spending (Cusack 1999), while others have looked separately on 
social or military expenditure (Klingemann et al., 1994; Whitten & Williams, 2011). Many studies 
have considered governments led by left-winged parties to be more responsive to unemployment 
and governments led by right-winged parties - to inflation (Hibbs 1977, Carlsen 1997). There is 
no unambiguous overall methodological approach as studies have looked at many different aspects 
of the relationship between government composition and fiscal policies. 
This master thesis explores partisan influences on fiscal policy during the relatively recent time 
period, 1995-2014, from OECD countries. Based on various discussion and implication in 
theoretical literature and empirical studies, following research goals were identified. First, the 
paper aims to analyze partisan differences reflected on public expenditure, whether right or left 
winged governments encourage an increase of general government spending. Second, we intend 
to analyze partisan effects in particular fields of general government expenditure, more 
specifically, on military and social spending. Third, this paper plans to study partisanship effect 
on government debt. Fourth research goal is to study how partisan ideological differences are 
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represented in macroeconomic policies, for instance, given the inflation-unemployment trade-off 
(so-called Philips curve), left-winged parties are expected to be more oriented to solving issues 
related to unemployment while right-winged parties are more averse to inflation.  
For empirical analysis paper uses the panel data of 25 OECD countries in time period from 1995 
through 2014. Results are derived based on fixed effect regression models. While ideology-policy 
relationship can be studied from very different angles, my analysis focuses on different aspects of 
fiscal policy. In other words, besides observing general government spending, I also study military 
and social expenditure. 
On the one hand, results of empirical analysis are opposite to conventional view which argues 
about major impact of partisan politics on fiscal policy (Cusack 1999). My findings suggest that 
there is no effect of partisanship on general government expenditure. Also I find no impact of 
ideological composition of government on social or military spending. On the other hand, I find a 
negative significant effect of right winged ideology on government debt. 
The paper contains five major sections. First section is an introduction. Second section reviews 
theoretical background and previous empirical studies of the problem. Third section introduces us 
with the data and methodology used. Forth section derives and discusses results. The last section 
concludes and presents the policy implications. 
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Theoretical Background 
 
 The topic “The connection between government ideological composition and fiscal policy” is a 
complex theme and covers various theoretical approaches that need to be discussed.  Before stating 
arguments on bases of different previous studies which correspond to hypothesis that will be tested 
in empirical part of this master thesis, I will provide brief overview of theoretical aspects that are 
related to the topic. The section of theoretical background consists of two parts. First part, political 
business cycle, discusses theoretical approaches that study the government and policy change 
relations. Second part, partisanship and fiscal policy, introduces arguments that support or oppose 
the effect of ideological composition on fiscal policy. 
This master thesis aims to analyze the connection between government ideology and fiscal policy. 
The effect of ideology emerges during policy implementation process, which is a complex 
procedure as there are several groups that participate in fiscal policy decision-making process 
(Kontopoulos 1999). On the one hand there is legislative side of decision-making which is 
presented by the number of parties in the ruling coalition, on another, there is executive side of 
decision-making which consists of ministers (Pirret 1997). This master thesis mainly focuses on 
the effect of ideology on fiscal policy through legislative side of decision-making as it is 
considered that in the legislative branch views of decision makers are more accurately reflected 
than in executive branch (Holcombe 2009). Also, it should be underlined that excluding executive 
side limits results derived in empirical part of this master thesis and author recommends further 
investigation of the problem. 
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Political Business Cycle 
 
There are many theoretical and empirical studies related to this topic, showing the impact of 
political system, different ideological composition of political parties and institutions on fiscal 
policy, especially on government expenditure. This field of study is often related to the idea of 
political business cycle – the concept that describes changes of macroeconomic variables caused 
by political cycles, mostly by elections (Drazen 2000).  On the one hand, it is considered that 
politicians manipulate the economy (usually by increasing or decreasing money supply) to achieve 
personal ends, especially during the election period1 (Nordhaus 1975). However, according to 
many papers political business cycles are result of voters’ choice of particular parties with certain 
ideological preferences (Hibbs 1977). 
The study of political business cycle is diverse and the figure 1 shows the scheme of the subject 
which represents branches of the political business cycle. There are distinguished two main models 
of political business cycles: opportunistic model and partisan model (Drazen 2000). Opportunistic 
political business cycle identifies a cycle in politicians’ behavior to increase chances of his or her 
re-election (Block 1999). The opportunistic political business cycle contains two different 
branches: First, classical theory – traditional opportunistic political business cycle and second, 
rational opportunistic political business cycle (Drazen 2000). While in traditional business cycle 
model opportunistic behavior is about the desire of parties to win election, rational opportunistic 
model additionally introduces the motivation of voters. (Nordhaus 1975). In this model voters are 
rational, they try to maximize their preference functions (Heckelman 1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Even though Central Bank is independent in most developed countries, political pressure during election period is 
intensive (Drazen 2001). 
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Figure 1. Scheme of political business cycle 
Source: compiled by the author based on Drazen (2000). 
 
While opportunistic political business cycle model is based on politicians’ motivation for re-
election, the partisan model focuses on different party policies based on different ideologies and 
economic goals (Hibbs 1977). In this model, business cycles are the result of ideological views 
and researchers point to the correlation between governments’ ideological composition and 
economic policies.  The partisan political business cycle is divided into two different branches: 
traditional partisan political business cycle model and rational partisan political business cycle 
(Drazen 2000). In rational partisan political business cycle model voters chose the party with best 
results. This model introduces median voter theorem, which deals with middle voters who have 
neither left nor right ideological believes (Congleton, 2002).  
According to the partisan model political views are divided in two groups: left and right. (Drazen 
2000). The partisan theory of macroeconomic policy is based on the idea that political parties 
weight nominal and real economic performance differently (Hibbs 1977).  The differences between 
political party ideologies reflected in economic preferences which are captured in partisan model 
are discussed in the following section of this paper. Generally, left and right ideology differences 
are related to the degree of government intervention in individuals’ life, both economically and 
socially. Left-winged governments are considered to have relatively more expanded role in the 
latter than right-winged governments (Rockey 2014).  
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Partisanship and fiscal policy 
 
Supporters of partisan political business cycle concept often argue that party ideologies are based 
on ideological and economic goals, thus as left wing and right wing ideologies have different 
economic views, their policies reflect ideological differences and end up in different fiscal policies 
(Hibbs 1977). 
There are many empirical and theoretical papers which have studied the impact of left-right 
orientation on the general government expenditure. Generally, it is considered that left winged 
parties care relatively more about unemployment while right winged parties focus on inflation 
issues (Hibbs 1977). It is also argued that left-winged governments tend to increase welfare 
expenditure but right-winged governments decrease it (Swank 1998). Government spending tends 
to increase more under governments of the left than under governments of the right (Blake 1993). 
All these views have opposing ideas which are based on different arguments related to origins of 
party ideology, country specific conditions and factors which cause different results in empirical 
papers with opposing conclusions. 
Many scholars who studied political business cycle argued about the cores of ideological 
formation, e.g. how the ideology is formed. While some considered ideology as an upstanding 
idea, that was formed once with own preferences and is unchangeable (Shikano, 2004), others 
provided different driven factors for ideology formation (Dhillon, 2003). Supporters of an idea 
that ideology is not a group of fixed policies, have been divided into two branches with two main 
views: ones who believed that public policy is demand-driven and others, who supported the idea 
that public policy is supply driven. In the first case, politicians are adjusting policies based on the 
needs of society, while in the second case politicians are adjusting policies in order to maximize 
revenue (Cusack, 1997), the latter is often shown by raised taxes (Rose 1985). So, when public 
policy is demand-driven, political ideology, whether a party is left oriented or right oriented, can 
be created by electorate itself, or in the other words, even parties who have radically left-wing 
ideology may implement right-winged policies because of the demand from society. At the same 
time, when policy is supply driven, even if government has a left-winged orientation, it may 
provide right-oriented policies, in order to maximize revenue. Thus, measuring ideological 
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composition of a government is a complicated process and other factors, such as the nature of 
electorate and general conditions of economy in a country play a role in presenting real ideological 
preferences, in other words, left winged parties can be right winged policy makers and vice versa 
under different circumstances.  
Another conclusion related to this discussion states that in reality parties do not have very different 
macroeconomic policies (Garrett & Lange, 1991) and even if they are different during election 
times, when parties start to govern the country, the policies implemented by left-wing and right-
wing parties actually converge with each other (Cusak, 1999). 
The question whether right parties are really right policy makers and left parties - left is a major 
question in many theoretical and empirical papers. Another important issue which is related to this 
problem introduces time period as a determinant factor, in other words, parties with left ideologies 
in the past are not always the same as left winged parties nowadays. Understanding of left-right 
scale has changed and countries are involved in partisan cycles very differently. The level of 
globalization plays a big major role in partisan politics (Goodman & Pauly, 1993; Andrews, 1994). 
Globalization and international integration has made connection between partisan ideologies and 
fiscal policy weaker than it was before. (Hagen, 2006; Efthyvoulou, 2011). While many studies 
support this idea, there are others with contradicting arguments. Globalization and international 
integration leads to other results as well. They cause market dislocation and governments often 
use fiscal policy to compensate it, in other words, as the level of globalization and 
internationalization increase, use of fiscal policy, especially by left winged governments, also 
rises. (Garrett, 1996, 1998). 
Besides globalization and international integration, other economic conditions have also changed. 
Changes are very diverse across countries, which has a major impact on partisan relations to fiscal 
policy and ideologies are reflected into policies differently in countries with different levels of 
economic development (Shi & Svensson, 2006).  Another factor which needs to be taken into 
consideration is the age of the democracy in the country. Countries with the same period of 
democratic system and nature of political system have similar patterns of political business cycles 
(Brender & Drazen, 2005). Another important issue which is related to ideological composition of 
government and its connection to fiscal policy is partisan differences shown in using fiscal policy 
as economic tool to solve macroeconomic problems inside country, in other words, it is interesting 
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which political ideology, left or right, is more fiscally irresponsible.  As we have discussed above, 
party ideologies are often modified due to different economic conditions or electorate demands. 
Left winged governments use fiscal policy more actively for solving macroeconomic problems 
than right winged governments when problems are related to high unemployment, but when all 
macroeconomic conditions are satisfactory inside the country, partisan differences are not 
important (Carlsen 1997). “It is theoretically considered that left oriented governments tend to 
spend more than right oriented governments, but it is also known that many empirical papers have 
shown different results. This is due to several reasons, which we have already mentioned. 
Additionally, often different empirical results are due to different methodologies used by 
researchers. For example, economic conditions, such as economic development level of a country, 
level of industrialization, unemployment level, productivity and other macroeconomic factors 
matter, because they have an influence on the formation of partisan ideologies. Countries with 
similar economic conditions are easier to be compared and studied, but results are contradictory, 
even when some studies have looked at same the period or countries’ databases Solano in 1983 
and Swank D. in 1988 undertook studies based on identical data set of OECD countries for 1960-
1971 time period, but the results were totally different. While Solano found no effect of parties on 
expenditure, Swank finds that the dynamics of domestic expenditure change is partially 
conditioned by political environments of particular eras. 
Many research papers about the connection between ideological compositions of government and 
fiscal policies take general government expenditure as a dependent variable, but some of them 
divide it into categories in order to emphasize effects of certain political ideologies on specific 
expenditure categories. Often the military and social expenditure as the two major categories of 
public expenditure are discussed. Scholars of political economy consider the composition of 
military and consumer spending as good predictors of electoral outcomes.. This leads discussion 
towards “guns versus butter” model, where left and right winged parties have different priorities. 
Generally, it is considered that right winged parties are in favor of increased military spending 
policy, while left oriented parties support increase of social expenditure (Klingemann et al., 1994; 
Whitten & Williams, 2011). Based on this view, left winged parties are expected to spend more 
on social issues and right winged parties on defense and security. But there is also an opposing 
argument. Countries which are military oriented might have increased general spending due to 
military purposes even under governments with left ideology, while, countries with stable defense 
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and security issues might cut their military spending down and increase social even when they 
have right winged governments. Thus, sometimes observing only general expenditure is not 
sufficient for discovering differences in spending attitudes. While under governments with 
different ideologies quantitative effect of spending is unchanged, partisan politics might have 
qualitative effects on expenditure, in other words, left-winged governments might increase social 
spending and decrease defense spending, but overall amount of expenditure may remain relatively 
unchanged. 
General government expenditure doesn’t always show a real effect of partisan influence on fiscal 
policy (Lockwood, 2011). It can be increased under right oriented government, but not due to 
reasons which are related to ideology, but due to increased revenue. In these case it is more justified 
to study the effect on deficit spending of a country, rather than on general expenditure.        
For conclusions of theoretical review of the connection between government ideological 
composition and fiscal policy, it can be concluded that the views on the connection between budget 
government ideological composition and fiscal policy are rather ambiguous both in previous 
theoretical and empirical papers.  Generally it is considered that left winged governments increase 
spending, but in many cases we have opposing results due to important economic conditions. 
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Empirical Study 
 
Based on theoretical discussion in previous chapter about partisan influences on fiscal policy 
several main empirical research questions were identified. First, this research paper aims to analyze 
partisan differences shown on public expenditure, more specifically, whether, right or left winged 
governments encourage an increase of general government spending. Second, I intend to analyze 
partisan effect on different fields of general government expenditure, more specifically, on military 
and social spending. Third, my aim is to study partisan effect on government debt. Fourth, this 
research paper aims to study how partisan ideological differences are presented in macroeconomic 
policies, in other words, whether opinions, that left winged parties are oriented to unemployment 
issues and right winged parties to solving problems related to high inflation, are true. 
 
     
Data and Method  
 
Empirical studies about the connection between government’s ideological composition and fiscal 
policy are mainly longitudinal or cross-sectional (Imbeau 2001). I concentrate on cross-sectional 
study and use panel data for empirical analysis.  Our sample consists of 25 OECD countries.  My 
aim is to analyze countries with similar democratic institutional arrangements and all   countries 
chosen for our  data are  parliamentary democracies2. This approach is justified by the argument 
that partisan theory is only practiced in democratic systems (Hibbs 1992). As my goal is to find 
the connection between political composition of government and fiscal policy, the data contains 
both macroeconomic and political indicators. The data covers 25 countries for the 1995-2014 time 
period, maximum 20 years for each country are available. The relationship between countries and 
ideology variable is presented in Table 1. Altogether there are have 499 observation for ideology 
variable. 148 observations belong to Center ideology, 160 observation belongs to Left and 191 – 
                                                          
2 The democratic form of government where one party or coalition, which has the highest representation in 
legislative organ, forms the government. 
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Right, and thus, the governments described by the different ideologies are represented more or less 
equally in the data. 
 
Table 1:  Frequencies of governments with different ideologies across the countries 
                       Ideology 
Country Center Left Right Total 
Austria 0 13 7 20 
Belgium 15 5 0 20 
Czech Republic 5 4 11 20 
Denmark 0 11 9 20 
Estonia 4 0 16 20 
Finland 11 8 1 20 
France 0 8 12 20 
Germany 11 9 0 20 
Hungary 9 6 5 20 
Ireland 9 0 11 20 
Israel 11 3 6 20 
Italy 1 8 11 20 
Japan 2 3 14 19 
Norway 2 14 4 20 
Poland 1 7 12 20 
Portugal 0 13 7 20 
Slovak republic 12 4 4 20 
Slovenia 5 11 4 20 
Spain 6 5 9 20 
Sweden 0 12 8 20 
Turkey 6 1 13 20 
United Kingdom 0 14 6 20 
Luxemburg 8 0 12 20 
Netherlands 10 1 9 20 
Switzerland 20 0 0 20 
Total 148 160 191 499 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
Descriptive statistics of the data are presented in Table 2, which provides summary of our sample 
and variables including missing values. In our panel data, maximum number of observations per 
variable with non-missing data equals to 499. We use in total 11 different variables.  For five 
variables - ideology, unemployment, growth rate, population size and inflation - there are no 
missing values in our sample. The maximum number of missing values is 39% for education 
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variable. In all cases, missing values are below 40%. We have used log transformation for the 
population variable. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
 
 
We use ordinary least squares (OLS), random effect (RE) and fixed effect (FE) methods for our 
regression analysis. Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects showed that 
random effect method is preferred to OLS, thus we will use the RE model instead of the OLS 
model. It is also essential to choose between RE and FE models, for these purpose we used 
Hausman test for fixed versus random effects model, which showed that fixed effect model is 
preferred, thus fixed effect model is our main estimation approach.  
 
The equation for the fixed effects model is as follows: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡+𝛼𝑖 + 𝑈 𝑖𝑡                                          (1) 
 
Where  𝑌𝑖𝑡 = dependent variable,  𝑋𝑖𝑡 = ideology (=0 left, =1 right, =2 center), 𝑍𝑖𝑡 = vector of other 
control variables, 𝛽𝐼 = the vector of parameter estimates,  𝛼𝑖  = unknown country-specific intercept 
(country fixed effect), 𝑈 𝑖𝑡= error term. 
Variable   Obs.   Mean  
 Std. 
Dev.  
 Min   Max   Max  
 % of 
missing 
values  
 Ideology  499.00                  -    
 General Expenditure  438.00 46.10 6.36 30.90 65.56 66.56 0.12 
 Military Expenditure  391.00 4.62 2.62 0.98 18.53 19.53 0.22 
 Social Expenditure  482.00 22.05 4.91 5.60 32.00 33.00 0.03 
 Unemployment rate, % 499.00 7.96 3.99 1.80 26.30 27.30 - 
 Growth rate, %  497.00 2.54 3.17 (14.72) 21.83 22.83 - 
 Population (in millions)  499.00 26.10 31.70 0.41 128.00 128.00 - 
 Inflation rate, % 499.00 4.15 9.41 (4.48) 88.11 89.11 - 
 Health  475.00 77.88 3.18 66.98 83.33 84.33 0.05 
 Education  302.00 98.59 4.35 72.97 112.11 113.11 0.39 
 Debt  348.00 55.47 32.91 3.68 195.99 196.99 0.30 
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In this research paper I intend to form four models with different dependent variables. In the first 
model, our dependent variable is general government spending as a share of GDP taken from the 
OECD database. General government expenditure as a dependent variable is used in many 
previous studies about the connection between ideology and fiscal policy (Cameron 1978, Schmidt 
1983). I have firstly looked at the total government expenditure as the dependent variable because 
it is considered that for identifying the connection between partisanship and fiscal policy, partisan 
influence on general expenditure is more important than on specific branch of expenditure (Sharpe 
and Newton 1984). 
In the second model our dependent variable is social expenditure as a share of GDP taken from 
the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX). In the third model our dependent variable is 
military expenditure as a share of GDP taken from World Bank dataset. Using specific expenditure 
branch as a dependent variable is a widely used practice (Klingemann et al., 1994). Generally it is 
considered that right winged governments spend more on military than left winged governments 
and left winged governments spend more on social expenditure than right winged governments 
(Whitten & Williams, 2011). 
In the fourth model, I observe on central government debt (% of GDP) as the dependent variable. 
As general government expenditure doesn’t always show a real effect of partisan influence on 
fiscal policy (Lockwood, 2011). It can be increased under right oriented government, but not due 
to reasons which are related to ideology, but due to increased revenue. In this case it is more 
justified to study the effect on the deficit spending of a country, rather than on the general 
expenditure level.        
 Main independent variable in our study is the party composition of a government presented by 
partisan ideology. For political ideology data we use Party Government Data Set (PGDS), which 
covers countries from 1995 or the year when they became parliamentary democracies till 2014 
(Katsunori Seki and Laron K. Williams, 2014). Variables used in our study provided by this dataset 
are the following: indicator of ideological Complexion of Government and Parliament (CPG), the 
dates of change of government and the duration of government by number of days. Many previous 
studies on partisan politics cover only two ideologies (left and right) in their analysis (Borg & 
Castles 1981, Castles 1982, Keman 1982), but as this method has been sharply criticized on bases 
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of excluding the effect of center ideology3 (Kersbergen 1995), I have included all three party 
ideologies, left, right and center, in this study. 
We have transformed Party Government Data Set according to the needs of our research.  First, as 
ideological complexion of government and parliament indicator contains strength of parties in 
government on the left-right dimension through a five point scale, we transformed it into three 
point scale. As previous CPG indicator was measured based on the share of seats of Left and Right 
wing parties in government and presented results in five point scale, from 1 to 5, the transformed 
data used the same logic (based on the share of seats), but presented results in Left, Right and 
Center Please correct the wording! 4. Second transformation is due to the dates of governments 
changed. As our needs are to determine political complexion of government yearly, the data of 
dates when governments changed is transformed into data which shows government’s ideological 
complexion every year.  Previous data set contained data of duration of governments in days. In 
transformed data, the ideological composition of a new government is attached to the year of its 
election, only if it was elected after 182th day of the year. 
Clearly, there are other factors that influence government expenditure than political ideology of 
government and variables are chosen in order to control for their effect. Other independent 
variables used in our study are as follows: unemployment rate, population size, GDP growth rate, 
GDP per capita, rate of inflation, health and education. The table 3 describes all the variables used 
in our analysis. 
These variables are chosen as they have been the most significant variables in previous studies 
(Lewis-Beck and Rice 1985, Rice 1986) Unemployment variable is necessary to include as a 
control variable, because in case of high unemployment rate governments run deficit due to 
automatic fiscal stabilizers (Rendahl, 2012). Often government policies are modified due to 
different health and education conditions (Laframboise, 2003) thus we included them as control 
variables. Inflation and growth rate are directly linked to government fiscal policies (Engen 1992). 
For example, during very fast growing economy, in order to deal with inflation gap, governments 
                                                          
3 Center position is often represented by Christian-Democrats (Kalyvas, 2010),  
44 In party government dataset parties were divided into 5 ideology groups, on left-right ideology scale: left, 
center-left, center, center-right and right. I have transformed these groups into 3 categories. I have grouped left 
and center-left as left ideology, similarly, right and center-right ideological groups were merged as right ideology, 
thus the transformation provided three groups: left, center and right.  
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often reduce spending policies (Forsythe, 2012). Central government debt is included as control 
variable for empirical analysis to capture the effect of deficit spending. Higher debt can increase 
government spending, as usually, governments take debts for spending purposes, but also, previous 
high debt policies might decrease present spending, because of increased liabilities in the future 
(Favero 2007).  
 
Table 3: Definitions of the variables used in empirical analysis 
Variable Description Source 
General 
expenditure 
General government spending, as a share of GDP and per 
person, provides an indication of the size of the government 
across countries.  
OECD Database 
Ideology 
Party composition of a government presented by partisan 
ideology: left, right, center 
Party Government 
Data Set (PGDS) 
Unemployment Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) 
World Bank 
database 
Growth rate GDP growth (annual %) 
World Bank 
database 
Population Population, total 
World Bank 
database 
Inflation Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
World Bank 
database 
Health Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 
World Bank 
database 
Education Primary completion rate, both sexes (%)  
World Bank 
database 
Debt Central government debt, total (% of GDP) 
World Bank 
database 
Military 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
Military expenditures data from SIPRI are derived from the 
NATO definition, which includes all current and capital 
expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping 
forces; defense ministries and other government agencies 
engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are 
judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and 
military space activities. 
World Bank 
database 
Social 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
Includes reliable and internationally comparable statistics on 
public and (mandatory and voluntary) private social 
expenditure at programme level as well as net social spending 
indicators. 
The OECD Social 
Expenditure 
Database (SOCX). 
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There are different factors that affect fiscal policy and government spending. Author recommends 
to include additional control presented by piece index or indicator of self-perceived security 
situation from survey for farther investigation of the problem. 
Following tables 4 shows correlation between variables under governments with different 
ideologies: all ideologies, left, center and right. Based on correlation results it can be concluded 
that correlations with debt are relatively lower in case of military expenditure. Also, health 
indicator is correlated primarily with social expenditure.  
 
Table 4: Correlation between variables under left, right and center-winged governments  
 
For testing the hypothesis that left winged governments care relatively more about unemployment 
than right winged governments, I check how government expenditure changes as unemployment 
increases. For smoothing the data of unemployment variable I use Hodrick-Prescott filter. I have 
made unemployment dummies according to country average unemployment rates. Unemployment 
level above country average equals to 1, in this case unemployment rate is considered to be high. 
Unemployment indicators below country average equal to 0 and in this case unemployment rate is 
not considered as a low. After creating unemployment dummies, I use FE regression model to look 
at the partisan effect on expenditure in cases of high or low level of unemployment. 
In order to test the hypothesis that right winged governments care relatively more about inflation 
than left winged governments, we check how inflation rate affects the public spending presented 
as general government expenditure. I have made inflation dummies according to country average 
  All ideologies Center Left Right 
  
General 
Expend
iture 
Social 
Expendi
ture 
Military 
Expendi
ture 
General 
Expenditure 
Social 
Expendi
ture 
Military 
Expendi
ture 
General 
Expendi
ture 
Social 
Expendi
ture 
Military 
Expendi
ture 
General 
Expendi
ture 
Social 
Expendi
ture 
Military 
Expendi
ture 
General Expenditure 1     1     1     1     
Social Expenditure 0.806 1   0.7287 1   0.8409 1   0.8188 1   
Military Expenditure -0.09 -0.3297 1 -0.0741 -0.397 1 -0.3035 -0.3807 1 -0.0019 -0.2876 1 
Debt 0.3745 0.3833 -0.0321 0.6554 0.5939 -0.3625 0.2444 0.1782 -0.146 0.2835 0.3802 0.0583 
Education 0.077 -0.0079 0.3537 0.034 -0.074 0.4305 0.1347 0.1954 0.177 0.0691 -0.0871 0.3964 
Health 0.1485 0.4702 0.0709 -0.1391 0.3136 0.2858 0.0165 0.3782 0.0633 0.4454 0.6216 -0.1455 
Inflation rate -0.0987 -0.3864 -0.0585 -0.0008 -0.4566 -0.0932 0.0397 -0.355 -0.2084 -0.3058 -0.3567 0.0728 
Population 0.1241 0.0962 0.1805 0.2657 0.1588 0.0692 -0.3266 -0.0562 0.35 0.2508 0.0807 0.242 
Unemployment rate 0.0914 0.0535 0.063 0.3307 0.2156 -0.017 0.033 0.0413 0.0615 -0.0268 -0.0481 0.1476 
Growth rate -0.3286 -0.3884 0.0819 -0.3868 -0.47 -0.0054 -0.1225 -0.2278 0.2829 -0.4186 -0.4249 0.0874 
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inflation rates: in case of inflation level above country average the dummy equals to 1, and in this 
inflation rate is considered to be high. In case of inflation indicators below country average dummy 
equals to 0 and in this case inflation rate is considered to be a low. After creating inflation 
dummies, I use FE regression model to look at the partisan effect on expenditure in cases of high 
or low level of inflation. 
 
Results and Discussions 
 
Table 5 shows relationship between different types of expenditures and ideologies.  It is clear that, 
on the average (as I have compared means of expenditures under governments with different 
ideologies) there is no significant difference between party ideologies.  Still, left winged 
governments have a little bit higher general and social expenditure, while right winged 
governments spend a little bit more on military. These results support the widely spread idea that 
left-winged governments care relatively more about social spending and right-winged 
governments relatively more about the military spending (Klingemann et al., 1994; Whitten & 
Williams, 2011). However, these results are based on simple statistics and the differences are 
statistically insignificant. 
 
Table 5:  Relationship between expenditure and ideology. 
  
General 
expenditure 
mean 
Military 
expenditure 
mean 
Social 
expenditure 
mean 
Left 48,28591 4,574597 23,90962 
Right 45,24753 4,545262 21,52054 
Center 44,6278 4,761556 20,70284 
 
Graphs 1, 2 and 3 show ideology-expenditure relationships for general, social and military 
spending (respectively). Based on Graph 1, it is clear that under left-wing ideology, governments 
have the highest expenditure. That is followed by right ideology and under the center ideology the 
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level of spending is the lowest. The Graph 2, which shows the relationship between social 
expenditure and ideology also presents the same results, but in Graph 3 which describes military 
spending and ideology relationship, results are not identifiable. This non-monotonic relationship 
doesn’t give a clear answer to our research question, but it partly corresponds to general theory 
that argues about relatively higher spending under left-winged governments (Swank 1998). 
 
Graph 1: General expenditure and ideology. 
 
Graph 2: Social expenditure and ideology         Graph 3: Military expenditure and ideology 
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Figure 4 shows differences of average general expenditure between left-right ideologies for each 
country. Figure 4 supports regression estimate results from tables 6, 7 and 8 and shows that there 
is no significant difference between left-winged and right-winged governments in context of 
general government spending. 
 
Figure 4: Difference of average expenditure between left-right ideologies 
 
 
Note: On the figure average general government spending under left and right ideologies (separately) is calculated for each 
country for the period 1995-2014. Y-axis show difference of average general expenditure between left and right ideologies 
(average general spending under left-winged government – average general spending under right-winged government). Positive 
values indicate that left-winged governments spend relatively more than right-winged governments on average. 
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After looking at descriptive evidence, I present results based on regression analysis. Following 
tables 6, 7 and 8 present regression estimate results for OLS, random effect and fixed effect 
models, where the dependent variable is general government expenditure. I present regression 
estimate results for all models, but conclusions of this paper are based on fixed effect model as 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects showed that random effect 
method is better than OLS and Hausman test did not support Random Effects.  
Table 6 presents results of OLS, RE and FE baseline models, which contain general government 
expenditure as a dependent variable and include all control variables besides macroeconomic 
variables: population, health, education and debt. FE model shows that there is no significant effect 
of ideology on general government expenditure (% of GDP). In two cases, for population and debt 
the effect is positive and significant. 
Table 7 presents results of OLS, RE and FE baseline models, which contain general government 
expenditure as a dependent variable and all independent variables including macroeconomic 
variables, unemployment, inflation and growth rate. FE model shows that there is no significant 
effect of ideology on general government expenditure (% of GDP). The coefficients for 
unemployment and debt are positive and significant, which is explained by an increasing tendency 
of government spending when unemployment rises and frequent debt covering of government 
expenditure. Health variable shows negative and significant sign, which is an expected result. As 
health variable is presented by life expectancy at birth, the lower the indicator gets the higher 
expenditure is used for health benefits.  Growth rate results in negative and significant sign, which 
is a logical result: as our dependent variable is general government expenditure over GDP, thus it 
is expected that it has negative relationship with GDP growth rate. 
Table 8 presents results of RE and FE models, which contain general government expenditure as 
a dependent variable, all control variables including macroeconomic variables and additionally to 
earlier models the year dummies. FE model shows that there is no significant effect of ideology 
on general government expenditure as a % of GDP. Results of other control variables are also 
unchanged compared to the previous models. All models showed no significant effect of ideology 
on general government expenditure. This result is presented in figure 4, which shows that countries 
from our sample have approximately same level of general government expenditure under left and 
right winged governments 
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Table 6: Results of OLS, random effect and fixed effect regression models without 
macroeconomic variables and year dummies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 7: Results of OLS, random effect and fixed effect regression models including 
macroeconomic variables, without year dummies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Variables OLS Random Effect Fixed Effect 
Right -3.842** 0.238 0.259 
  (-3.705) (-0.495) (-0.553) 
Center -2.6190.1 0.479 0.732 
  (-2.270) (-0.84) (-1.317) 
Log population -0.9250.1 -0.767 31.626** 
  (-2.031) (-0.805) -3.225 
Health 0.139 -0.071 -0.193 
  (-0.952) (-0.515) (-1.323)   
Education 0.138 -0.051 -0.022 
  (-1.236) (-0.863) (-0.367)   
Debt 0.064** 0.102** 0.130** 
  (-4.001) (-5.756) (-6.763) 
_cons 35.1810.1 62.327** -456.753** 
  (-2.311) (-3.348) (-2.899)   
R-squared 0.161   0.218 
Variables OLS 
Random 
Effect 
Fixed Effect 
Right -4.142** -0.246 -0.194 
  (-4.170) (-0.590) (-0.473)   
Center -2.178 0.85 0.9710.1 
  (-1.968) (-1.718) (-1.996) 
Log population -1.268** -0.896 22.0500.1 
  (-2.783) (-1.005) (-2.378) 
Unemployment 0.137 0.354** 0.325** 
  (-1.162) (-4.419) (-3.846) 
Growth rate -0.632** -0.342** -0.329** 
  (-4.960) (-6.644) (-6.506)   
Inflation -0.08 0.018 -0.029 
  (-0.422) -0.231 (-0.374)   
Health -0.032 -0.257 -0.424** 
  (-0.160) (-1.867) (-2.836)   
Education 0.145 0.014 0.013 
  (-1.275) (-0.242) (-0.225) 
Debt 0.063** 0.070** 0.086** 
  (-4.176) (-4.205) (-4.505) 
_cons 54.001** 72.255** -286.364 
  (-2.698) (-3.949) (-1.954)   
R-Squared 0.261   0.428 
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Table 8: Results of OLS, random effect and fixed effect regression models including 
macroeconomic variables and year dummies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 9 shows whether the results are robust to excluding particular countries”. In first case we 
have excluded Switzerland as it contained only center ideology observations. In second case we 
have excluded United Kingdom as it is contained the highest number of left ideology observations. 
In third case we have excluded Estonia as it contained the highest number of right ideology 
observations. FE regression analysis for all cases showed the same results, thus our results are 
robust. 
 
 
 
 
Variables Random Effect Fixed Effect 
Right -3.498** -0.382 
  (-3.401) (-1.124)   
Center -2.157 0.351 
  (-1.925) (-0.863) 
Log population -1.343** 16.628 
  (-2.952) (-1.76) 
Unemployment 0.054 0.071 
  (-0.456) (-0.973) 
Growth rate -1.042** -0.300** 
  (-5.530) (-4.672)   
Inflation -0.173 -0.131 
  (-0.824) (-1.847)   
Health 0.017 0.559 
  (-0.077) (-1.519) 
Education 0.092 -0.068 
  (-0.806) (-1.450)   
Debt 0.051** 0.062** 
  (-3.415) (-3.664) 
_cons 70.608** -253.461 
  (-3.252) (-1.512) 
R-squared   0.696 
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Table 9: Robustness checks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Table shows fixed effect regression estimates; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
There are many theoretical and empirical papers that studied policy-ideology relationship. Many 
studies have considered that left winged parties care relatively more about unemployment while 
right winged parties focus on inflation issues (Hibbs 1977).  While regression analysis for the 
effect of partisanship on general expenditure show no significant sign, next steps for our empirical 
study is to firstly to test the hypothesis that argue about relatively more increased spending policies 
for left-winged governments when unemployment rate is high and secondly test the hypothesis 
that argue about relatively more increased spending policies under right oriented governments 
when inflation rate is high. 
Table 10 presents fixed effect regression estimation results for general expenditure. The model 
contains all microeconomic variables and year dummies. After using Hodrick-Prescott filter for 
Variables 
Excluding 
Switzerland 
Excluding 
United 
Kingdom 
Excluding 
Estonia 
Right -0,388 -0,382 -0,503 
  (-1.130)    (-1.124)    (-1.449)    
Center 0,345 0,351 0,131 
  (-0,839) (-0,863) (-0,309) 
Unemployment 0,069 0,071 0,119 
  (-0,932) (-0,973) (-1511) 
Log population 18.270*   16.628*   24.844**  
  (-1903) (-1,76) (-2337) 
Growth rate -0.293*** -0.300*** -0.159*   
  (-4.464)    (-4.672)    (-1.753)    
Inflation -0.140*   -0.131*   -0.217**  
  (-1.947)    (-1.847)    (-2.323)    
Health 0,568 0,559 -0,379 
  (-1528) (-1519) (-0.609)    
Education -0,069 -0,068 0,003 
  (-1.452)    (-1.450)    -0,048 
Debt 0.060*** 0.062*** 0.065*** 
  (-3457) (-3664) (-3596) 
_cons -280,219 -253,461 -327.294*   
  (-1.645)    (-1.512)    (-1.862)    
R-squared 0,7 0,696 0,685 
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unemployment variable and calculating country average rates, I have made unemployment 
dummies, which indicate either high or low unemployment level. Unemployment rates above 
country average rate are considered as high unemployment, otherwise they are considered as low 
unemployment Results show that there is no significant effect of partisan ideologies on general 
expenditure, regardless of the unemployment rate level. After calculating country average inflation 
rates, I have constructed inflation dummies, which indicate either relatively high or low inflation 
level. Inflation rates above county average are considered as high inflation, otherwise – low. 
Results show that there is no significant effect of ideology on government spending regardless 
inflation level. 
 
Table 10: Results of fixed effect regression model including macroeconomic variables and 
year dummies for high and low unemployment and inflation cases. 
Variables 
fixed  
effect 
Variable fixed  effect 
Left  ideology                                  
High unemployment rate 
-0.708 
Left  ideology                                  
High inflation rate 
-0.175 
  (-0.975)     (-0.318)   
Right ideology                      
Low unemployment rate 
-0.555 
Right ideology                                    
Low inflation rate 
-0.529 
  (-0.981)     (-0.977)   
Right ideology                             
High unemployment rate 
-0.689 
Right ideology                       
High inflation rate 
0.029 
  (-0.906)     -0.046 
Center ideology                           
Low unemployment rate 
0.166 
Center ideology                         
Low inflation rate 
0.306 
  (-0.254)   (-0.546) 
Center ideology                           
High unemployment rate 
1.329 
Center ideology                      
High inflation rate 
0.403 
  (-1.544)   (-0.595) 
Unemployment 0.334** Unemployment 0.322** 
  (-2.91)   (-3.81) 
Growth rate -0.335** Growth rate -0.325** 
  (-6.623)     (-6.421)   
Log population 21.306** Log population 21.171** 
  (-2.294)   (-2.271) 
Inflation -0.018 Inflation -0.027 
  (-0.226)     (-0.276)   
Health -0.355** Health -0.416** 
  (-2.294)     (-2.752)   
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Note: Table shows fixed effect regression estimates; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Theoretically it is considered that government spending tends to increase more under governments 
of the left than under governments of the right (Blake 1993), which is opposed by regression 
analysis results presented above. Also, it is argued that differences between left-winged 
government spending policies and right-winged government spending policies are not always 
shown in increased or decreased general spending, but in specific expenditure categories, such as 
military and social spending. Generally, it is considered that right winged parties are in favor of 
increased military spending policy, while left oriented parties support increase of social 
expenditure (Klingemann et al., 1994; Whitten & Williams, 2011). 
 Table 11 presents results of two FE regression models. First model contains military expenditure 
as a dependent variable, second model includes social expenditure as dependent variable. Both 
models contain all control variables including macroeconomic variables and year dummies. FE 
model shows that there is no significant effect of party ideology on either social or military 
expenditure. Relatively high unemployment rate has positive significant association with social 
and negative significant sign towards military expenditure. Health has positive significant sign in 
both models. Inflation has negative significant sign in first model where dependent variable is 
social expenditure, thus, lower inflation results in higher spending on social programs. Debt has 
positive significant sign towards social and negative significant sign towards military expenditure, 
thus, debt is probably used for social spending rather than for military purposes. 
 
 
 
Education 0.028 Education 0.013 
  (-0.47)   (-0.235) 
Debt 0.079** Debt 0.086** 
  (-4.021)   (-4.5) 
_cons -280.571*  _cons -272.759*  
  (-1.914)     (-1.853)   
R-squared 0.439 R-squared 0.437 
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Table 11: Results of fixed effect regression model including macroeconomic variables and  
year dummies for military and social expenditure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Regression analysis both, for general government expenditure as dependent variable and specific 
category of expenditure, social or military expenditure, as dependent variable showed the same 
results, that there is no significant difference between left and right oriented governments. 
However, expenditure doesn’t always show a real effect of partisan influence on fiscal policy 
(Lockwood, 2011). Many scholars consider that it is more justified to observe the partisan effect 
on deficit spending, rather than on general expenditure or any specific field of government 
spending (Lockwood, 2011). 
Table 12 shows results of random effect and fixed effect regression models, where government 
debt (center government debt, % of GDP) is taken as dependent variable The model contains all 
Variables 
Social 
expenditure 
Military  
expenditure 
Right 0.019 -0.084 
  (-0.089) (-0.852)    
Center 0.016 0.131 
  (-0.063) (-1.107) 
Log population 5.724 -8.774*** 
  (-1.039) (-3.421)    
Unemployment 0.121*** -0.065*** 
  (-2.662) (-3.075)    
Growth rate -0.165*** 0.029 
  (-4.132) (-1.551) 
Inflation -0.143** -0.017 
  (-2.244) (-0.808)    
Health 0.586** 0.316*** 
  (-2.546) (-2.963) 
education -0.014 0.044*** 
  (-0.472) (-3.201) 
Debt 0.030*** -0.015*** 
  (-2.87) (-3.169)    
_cons -114.666 119.231*** 
  (-1.176) (-2.616) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.656 0.516 
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control variables including macroeconomic variables and year dummies.  In contrast with all 
other models presented above, this regression model shows different results as there is a negative 
significant effect of right ideology on government debt, thus, compared to left-winged 
governments, right-winged governments have significantly low debt policies. 
 Based on the results from table 12, it can be concluded that while left and right oriented 
governments have equal spending policies, left-winged governments sponsor government 
spending by debt and right-winged governments increase spending due to increased revenue. 
 
Table 12: Results of random effect and fixed effect regression model including 
macroeconomic variables and year dummies for government debt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
In empirical part of this master thesis I have tested hypothesis formed in theoretical part and 
derived results. Following section summarizes results and provides conclusions and farther 
recommendations for the study of this topic. 
Variable Random Effect Fixed Effect 
Right -4.564** -3.829** 
  (-2.807) (-2.469)   
Center 3.086 2.539 
  (-1.563) (-1.352) 
Unemployment 1.943** 2.121** 
  (-6.519) (-7.42) 
Growth rate 0.08 0.012 
  (-0.391) (-0.062) 
Log population 8.673* -139.886** 
  (-1.868) (-4.332)   
Inflation 0.103 0.455 
  (-0.337) (-1.531) 
Health 0.698 1.477** 
  (-1.269) (-2.587) 
Education 0.636** 0.582** 
  (-2.876) (-2.753) 
Constant -221.258** 2127.142** 
  (-2.573) (-4.173) 
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Conclusions 
 
 
The aim of my research paper is to find connections between the ideological composition of 
government and fiscal policy. Our research goals were to analyze how partisan differences are 
reflected in general government expenditure, in particular whether right or left winged 
governments lead to increase of public spending  The paper aims to observe partisan effects on 
military and social expenditure and study the impact of right-left ideology on general spending in 
cases of high unemployment and inflation. Also, the paper aimed to look at the effect of 
partisanship on central government debt, in other words, to observe the partisan difference of 
deficit spending policies. 
 Based on empirical analysis in previous section about partisan influences on fiscal policy several 
conclusions can be made. First, we found no effect of partisanship on general expenditure, second 
we found no effect of party ideology on specific field of expenditure such as military and social 
expenditure. Third, we find negative significant effect of right ideology on center government debt. 
Fourth, we find no effect of ideology on general expenditure under different levels of 
unemployment or inflation. This results indicate that understanding of left-right scale has changed. 
The level of globalization has played a big role in partisan politics (Goodman & Pauly, 1993; 
Andrews, 1994) and has weaken the connection between partisan ideologies and fiscal policy 
(Hagen, 2006; Efthyvoulou, 2011). 
Based on empirical results of this paper, on the one hand there is no connection between 
ideological differences of government and fiscal policies as partisanship does not influence volume 
of government spending, but on another, left-winged governments use relatively higher debt 
policies than right-winged governments as we found negative significant effect of right ideology 
on center government debt. 
This master thesis has several limitations. It mainly focuses on the effect of ideology on fiscal 
policy through legislative side of decision-making as it is considered that in the legislative branch 
views of decision makers are more accurately reflected than in executive branch (Holcombe 2009), 
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but excluding executive side limits results derived in empirical part of this master thesis and author 
recommends further investigation of the problem.  
Politicians can be adaptive or may actively influence the economic situation. In realty we do not 
know which attitude is dominating. Whether they adapt to voters’ wishes or whether they influence 
variables to change the voters’ evaluations. This master thesis has assumed that politicians are 
partisan politicians who are assigned to ideologies. But according to Rothenberg (1965) politicians 
have to win first the votes before they can trying to act according to the ideological part of their 
utility functions. Political business cycle has two main branches: opportunistic and partisan. While 
the partisan model focuses on different party policies based on different ideologies and economic 
goals, opportunistic political business cycle model is based on politicians’ motivation for re-
election (Hibbs 1977). Results derived in empirical part of this paper are limited to partisan 
political business cycle and author recommends the study of this problem by including 
opportunistic effect as well.   
In different phases of the political process e.g. the pre-elective phase, a campaign phase, a 
government forming phase, and a government phase (Schleicher 1971) the policies are different. 
Another way to extend the study is to focus on different phases of the political process separately. 
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Appendices  
 
Appendices 1: Overview of the studies on the linkages between government ideological composition and 
fiscal policies 
 
 
Title Author(s) year Results CoCuntries Period 
Political business cycle 
in industrial countries 
Alberto 
Alesina,  
1989 
Finds significant partisan influence 
on fiscal policy.  
Western 
europe, 
industrial 
economies 
  
A Partisan Model of 
Government 
Expenditure 
Thomas 
Bräuninger 
2004 
Finds support for the effect of 
partisan composition of 
governments on macroeconomic 
policy-making. The results suggest 
that the actual spending preferences 
of parties matter whereas the results 
do not indicate that parties of the 
left consistently differ from parties 
of the right in their spending 
behavior 
. 
19 OECD 
countries 
1971-
1999 
Andrd Blais, 
Universite de Montreal 
Donald Blake, 
University of British 
Columbia Stdphane 
Dion, Universite' de 
Montre'al 
Do Parties 
Make a 
Difference? 
Parties and 
the Size of 
Government 
in Liberal 
Democracies 
2011 
 The analysis shows that 
governments under left ideology 
spend relatively more than parties 
of the right-winged governments.  
15 liberal 
democracies 
1860-
1987 
Political Cycles in 
Public Expenditure: 
Butter vs Guns 
Vincenzo 
Bove 
2013 
. First, governments tend to bias 
outlays towards social expenditure 
and away from military expenditure 
at election times. Second, 
membership in the NATO alliance 
affects the timing of election-driven 
military spending manipulations. 
Perhaps Third, partisan distinctions 
are clearly discernible butdiffer 
between the two types of 
expenditure: while certain 
categories of social expenditure are 
higher during left administrations, 
22 oecd 
countries 
1988-
2008 
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military expenditure are higher 
during right administrations. 
Who Spends More: 
Left or Right? 
Michel Kelly 2013 
In reality, there is no systematic 
relation, for any of the three 
governments, between the left-wing 
or right-wing ideologies of the 
parties in power and the evolution 
of public spending as a share of 
GDP. In all three cases, it is 
actually left-wing governments that 
most reduced the relative size of 
government, and in one of the three 
cases (the United States), it is a 
right-wing government that most 
increased it. 
Canadian 
federal 
government, 
the Quebec 
government, 
and the 
American 
federal 
government. 
1968-
2012 
Fiscal policy, deficits 
and politics of 
subnational 
governments: 
The case of the 
German Laender   
Helmut Seitz 2000 
Regional differences in public debt 
accumulation and public 
expenditure policy in general are 
largely determined by interregional 
differences in economic 
performance, no significant impact 
on the ideological composition of 
the Laender governments was 
found. 
Germany 
1970-
1999 
Partisan politics and 
fiscal policy 
Cusack, 
Thomas R. 
1997 
The evidence produced in this 
paper suggests that the relationship 
between partisanship and fiscal 
policy is contingent on 
macroeconomic conditions. The left 
has tended to treat fiscal policy as a 
counter-cyclical tool, tightening 
fiscal policy when aggregate 
demand is high and loosening it to 
stimulate the economy when 
demand is low. On the other hand, 
the right has either refrained from 
such activism or actually conducted 
procyclical fiscal policies. The 
evidence also suggests that these 
partisan-based differences have 
beenreduced over the recent 
decades.  
14 OECD 
countries 
1961-
1991 
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Fiscal Policy and the 
Democratic Process in 
the European Union¤ 
William 
Roberts Clark 
2001 
Finds that there is no systematic 
evidence for partisan differences. 
Given this, it is hard to see how 
EMU can add to the democratic 
deficit in the 
European Union. 
European 
Union 
countries 
1981-
1992 
GovernmentWeakness 
and Local Public Debt 
Development in 
Flemish Municipalities 
John 
Ashworth 
2005 
there is general Supports for the 
fact that the number of parties Jaan: 
perhaps you could add that as the 
control variable in your 
regressions…in a coalition has a 
positive effect on the municipality’s 
short-term debt levels–in line with 
government inaction models. 
298 Flemish 
municipalities  
1977-
2000 
Partisan politics and 
public finance: 
Changes in public 
spending 
in the industrialized 
democracies, 1955–
1989 
Cusack, 
Thomas R. 
1997 
The results of the analysis lend firm 
support to the partisan politics 
model. The results also suggest, 
contrary 
to conventional wisdom, that 
partisan political influences have 
not been eliminated with the 
tightening of linkages to the 
international economy. 
16 OECD 
countries 
1955-
1989 
Do political 
determinants affect the 
size 
and composition of 
public expenditure? 
A study of the Indian 
states 
Bharatee 
Bhusana 
Dash 
2013 
The overall findings of the study 
suggest that the relationship 
between expenditure measures and 
political determinants across the 
Indian states validates the proposed 
hypotheses even after controlling 
for the traditional and other 
unobservable determinants. These 
findings are robust to various forms 
of sensitivity analysis. 
14 Indian 
States 
1980-
2007 
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Appendices 2: Homogeneity of general expenditure across countries under left ideology 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 3: Homogeneity of general expenditure across countries under right ideology 
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